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Royal  Albert  Hall  - London  25  March  1980 Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
The  performance of British industry in relation to  that of most  of  the 
rest of  the  European  Community  is one  of  the major  issues at the  centre of 
the  Community's  domestic policies  today. 
The  British economy  is an  industrialised economy;  it has  been 
industrialised for  lqnger  than anywhere  else in the world;  your agricultural 
sector is indeed  so  small  that  the normal  preoccupations with agricultural 
policy;  taken for  granted  in other member  states are virtually absent here. 
But  all is not well,  and  I  hope  you  will bear.with me  if I  use  your 
invitation to address you  about Britain's industrial performance  and 
potential  in  the  European  9ommunity  as  an opportunity  to bring  to  this 
'  problem a  European view.  For we  have  learnt,  if it were  not already self-
evident  that  the  problems  of one  member  state are  indeed  the problems  of 
the  Community  as a  whole. 
I  propose  to address our  subject  from  three points of view: 
structural change  in the British economy  in relation to experience 
elsewhere  in the  European  Community; 
particular aspects of  the British situation; 
I 
the  scope  and  potentialities of European policy. 
Structural change 
High  growth rates before  1973  led  to generally full  employment,  and 
growth  to  some  extent has reflected a  strengthening of  the productive 
system,  but partly concealed continuing disparities between member  states  • 
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There  has  been a  sharp deterioration in the ;economic  situation in  ·~Ul 
member  states during  the past  few  ye~:trs;  in particular  tl\~  reappearance of 
unemployment.  This  is due  in part  to  the  persistence ofcstructural factors 
which  already existed before  the present crisis began. 
The  effects are different among  the member  states;  their industrial 
structure and  performance are  increasingly different,  par·ticularly their 
ability to adjust  to change.  It has  reached  a  point whe#e  the  individual 
member  states'  interest in particular Community  policies•are becoming 
increasingly divergent. 
What  are  these disparities? 
For  example,  when  we  look at the  Community's  international  trade in 
manufactured  products  we  l~arn that most  member  countries are more  involved 
in products which  are directly competing with·tho•e of  the  newly  industria-
lising countries  than are either Japan or  the  Uriiited  States.  In particular 
those  products which  embody  very  low  stdlled labour or a  very  low  capital 
content.  The  former  accounted  for  56%  of  imports  *rom  the newly  industrialising 
countries  in  1976,  the  latt~r 34%.  The  corresponding figures  for  trade 
between developed countries are:  .22%  for productsicontaining very  low 
skilled labour and  6%  for products wirh a  very low:capital content. 
Whereas  the  USA  and  Japan have  been reducing their involvement  in these 
products- which  is
1illustrated by  their falling export market  shares, 
the  EEC  as  a  whole  has  increased its share. 
Among  our member  states,  Italy an the  United  Kingdom  are far more 
exposed  in this respect  than is the  rewt  of  the Community.  In  1976  the  UK 
and  Italy accounted  for  II a nci  12%  re$pectively of the market  for activities 
with a  very  low  skilled labour content.  The  share of  the  USA  was  9%,  and 
JAPAN's  share was  10%,  but  these  two  countries are also much  less 
specialised in this product range  than either the UK  t:1r  Italy. 
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The  exposed countries risk losing  their share of world markets  and  of 
the Community  market  to competition from  the NIC's. 
On  the  other hand  the  Community  is by  - and  - large  in a  satisfactory 
position for  products which  need  much  skilled  labour  to  make  and  which 
consequently embody  high  technology and  provide well  paid  jobs.  German  and 
United Kingdom  exports are still r~l~tively specialised in these areas.  The 
United States is in the  strongest pcfit.ion here.  Japan has  not yet gained 
access  to  these markets -we are talfing about aircraft, nuclear power,  for 
example  and  the position of other member  states,  like Italy and  France is 
improving but precarious,  not least because  we  expect Japan  to make  a  major 
effort to export  in these  areas  in the  near  future. 
When  we  look at exports of  equipment  and  intermediate  goods  as well 
as  industries depending  on  basic  research and  advanced  technology,  we  find 
that JAPAN  has  doubled  its export market  share between  1963  and  1976  (from  7% 
to more  than  15%)  primarily at the expense of  the  USA  and  the United  Kingdom. 
The  United  States,  however,  retains  an  important position with a  16.4%  share 
o~ exports, whilst  the  UK  share has  fallen  from  13%  to  7%.  Germany  has 
retained  some  20%  of  the world market  in basic products  since  1963. ~ 4  -
Finally when  we  look at our  position with respect  to  products which 
are  fundamental  to  future  technological  developmel\t ·like research based 
products and  services,  computers,  telecommuni~ations,  micro~electronics we 
find  that  these  industries are concentrated  in Japan,  the  Uaited  States and 
Germany,  whereas  their overall market  share is in the  region of  49%  for 
manufactured  products  generally,  it is as high as  60%  in  these activities, 
with Germany  accounting  for  almost  20%.in  1976.  The  other'"member  states do 
not have  a  favourable  position in these areas •• 
Japan has  prog;esall!d  spectacularly here;  almost  traditl.8  its share of 
export markets  in these areas between  1963  and  1977.  More  specifically, 
JAPAN  increased  its export market  share of advanced  technology products 
from  8%  in  1963  to nearly  43%  in  1976.  The  United[Kingaom,  which  started 
i 
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from  a  good  position in these activities has  been  ~eclining rapidly. 
In  1963  the  UK  accounted  for  12%  of exports  in this area,  by  1976  this was 
only  7%. 
Thus,  in addition to  the  well  known  ~aps in ttandards of  living, 
levels of wages,  investment  and  productivity among  the member  states,  there 
are very prejudicial disparities in the  structure of  industry,  in its 
capacity to  develop  in the  future,  and  its capacity to meet  competition 
from  the  NIC's,  Japan and  the United States. 
How  did we  get into this mess? 
The  structural• problems of  European  industry -.re  today  an  important 
constraint on  the  integration of  Europe  and  on  harmonious  development  of 
the  economy  and  society during  the  next decade.  This weakness  is manifest 
in the  inability of  industry  to create sufficient employment,  and  in the 
lack of  international competitiveness. 
As  we  have  seen  some  parts of  European  industry embody  highly 
sophisticated  technology and  produce  goods  very efficiently;  indeed many 
firms  are also able  to sell at internationally competitive prices.  Indeed 
Some  firms  are able  to meet  any  competiti·on in the  wor~d.  This  is good, 
but no  more  than one  would  expect.  But  this is not  the problem. ----------------------- ----------------------· 
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The  problem  ~s  that  those  firms,  or  sectors,  which are  succeeding are 
not sufficiently numerous  nor  is their product sufficiently large,  nor are 
they  sufficiently widespread,  to  ensure either  the  necessary exports,  or 
the  employment  in the  context of  the  enhanced  constraints of energy, 
materials and  international competition we  anticipate. 
A second  reason for disparities between member  countries  is their 
different economic  history.
1 
The  areas  of nineteenth century industri-
alisation can now,  with feJ exceptions  be  identified by  their unfavourable 
industrial and  social structure,  location and  infrastructure. 
A further,  major  reason for  the disparities which  exist are  the very 
different performances  in terms  of  successful  industrial  investment.  This 
can be  explained partly in  terms  of  a  declining rate of profit and  a  low 
rate of  investment but is also due  to  the unwillingness of  some  firms  to 
invest  in the  face  of high risks,  to  bad  investment decisions  taken by 
governments,  and  to  the  large proportion of  research and  development 
expenditure devoted  to uneconomic  activities. 
X  X  X 
In this context  I  think it is necessary  to pay particular attention to 
the  position of  the  United  Kingdom  as  the  largest economy  whose  relative 
position is declining most  rapidly. - 6  -
The  British Situation 
If that  problem can be  'solved,  then other less difficult problems  can 
'be  solved  as well.  If the  problem cannot be  solved  then  the European 
Community  may  lbok a  very different place  in ten years'  time,  than it does 
today;  either  tbe  composition or its pol:i.cies would  have be• changed. 
In spite of  the fact  that in Ger.na:).y,  France  and  Italy :several 
industrial sectors have  recovered  fairly well  from  the  1975  recession,  in 
Britain nearly all industrial  sectors have  continued  in recession.  In 
addition to  stagnating demand  for  consumer  goods,  ~quipment manufacturers 
have  suffered from  the  continuing recession in  inv~stment.  Most  intermediate 
products  (steel, minerals,  construction good$)  are~also still in a  severe 
recession.  Chemicals  is  the  only major  sector whic·h .;has  performed  relatively 
well.  Among  the  smaller  sectors,  only pr-'ecision ~  and  computers  have 
shown  some  promising results. 
Because of  the very  slow overall  growth and  the decline in industrial 
activities,  the  tertiary sector  in Bri.tain has  come  to represent a  larger 
proportion of activity than anywhere  else in the  Conununity.  This  process 
of de-industrialisation in Britain is at best premature,  and  at worst 
debilitating.  In  the  long-term there may  well  be  s.ome  point  in shifting 
industry away  from  traditional capital 2lll'l.d  energ~.ntensive activities, 
However,  such a  change must  be  associated with the development  of other 
competitive activities whieih  >Wlill  pro'\t'ide  empl~t  .and  exports.  This  is 
not  happening.  In particular, it seems :unwis"e  to ·~e,ly on  the  tertiary 
sector for  export earnings,  because apart  from  bankil\8  and  insurance  the 
new  service activities which  are being 'developed are increasingly related 
to  the manufacturing process itself. 
.f. --------~----------------------
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By  comparison beyond  a  general  similarity with  the  United  Kingdom, 
Italy shows  quite different structural  trends.  The  two  countries  share a 
low  rate of  investment,  rapidly rising costs and  periods of currency 
depreciation. 
But  as  a  result of remarkable effort  to  industrialise since  the 
1950s,  the  importance of manufacturing  industry in Italy has  steadily 
increased.  Growth  was  rapid  in sectors  such as steel and  machinery.  And  in 
the more  traditional branches  such as  textiles and  clothing,  shoes  and 
furniture Italy's much  lower  rate of productive  investment  compared  to 
other European countries corresponds  to a  fairly high specialisation in 
more  labour  intensive sectors. 
X  X  X 
Britain's problems  are  Europe's  problems  for  two  very clear reasons; 
the disparities in industrial  performance are a  serious  brake  on  the 
process of  integrating the 'European market;  and  there  is an uncomfortable 
parallel between Britain's 
1performance  compared  with the rest of  the 
Community  and  the risk of  a  future decline in Europe  compared  with the rest 
of  the world,  and  particularly with Japan. 
Consequently  the  Community  cannot  treat the British situation as  a 
purely national situation and  must  participate in its solution. 
I 
Although Britain is not alone  in having structural problems  in its 
industry the  situation is particularly preoccupying  in the United  Kingdo~, 
There  are also  some  aspects of  the current difficulties of British 
firms  to which Europe  does  not  have  the  solution,  and  they are certainly not 
of  the Community's  making. - 8  -
In particular  the  high exchange rate,  and  very high interest rates 
which are hitting the exports,  profitt:ddility and  :investment plans of numy 
firms.  The  only solution we  can offer  to  th~s situation would  be  for Britain 
to join the  European Honetary  System,  at an appropriate ex.change  rate where 
B,ritish  indust·ry would  be  competitive,  and  to benefit. frout .the  stability, 
flexibility and  resources which would  be  available  through the  EMS. 
Productivity and  Trade 
Exports  have  fallen drastically fro-n  13.7%  in  1963  to  8.6%  in  1977,  while 
Germany's  share  remained  constant,  about  19%  and  France's share  increased  from 
8.5%  to  9.1%.  Italy's share also  increased  from  5'.8%,  to  7 •. 1%.  The  shares 
of  the  other  EEC  countries were  fairly stable. 
UK  share of world  exports  has also fallen markedly.  In  1958  the 
UK  accounted  for  10%  of world  exports,  in  1968  this was  7.2%  and  by  1978 
5.  7%  (excluding  intra-EE.C  trade).  Other  EEC  collmltJdes  either retained  a 
fairly constant  percentage  share or  increased  their share;  Germany  for 
example  increased  its share of world  exp0rts  from  ~.3% in  1958  to  12%  in 
1978. 
In all manufacturing sectors exceiJ't  agriculture and  foodstuffs 
productivityis  the  lowest  in  the  Commuoity.  The  Italian figures  are also 
low.  In  the  period  1973-1977  the average  armual  ~ow.th rate of productivity 
in the  UK  was  0.  4% ,,  in indus try it was:  -();.,]%  .• 
Comparable  figures  for  Germany  are 3.3%  and  4.5% 
Belgium  2.2 
France 
The  slower  growth rate of productivity in tllle  UK  with respect  to 
Germany  has  been apparent  for  at least:  a  century.  In  terms  of manufacturing 
productivity Germany  overtook  the  I:JK  in the  t9'30s  and  decisively in the 
early  1950s.  In  1976  w.  Germany,  Fram.ee  and  the  ~m:elux countries  produced 
over  70%  more  per  employee  in industry than the  UK  and Italy some  15%  more. 
./. 
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On  present  trends  in a  few  years  the  UK  will  be overtaken by  other 
future  Community  countries,  particularly Spain. 
Whilst  Germany  has  consistently accounted  for  between a  fifth and  a 
quarter of manufactured exports  throughout  this century,  the  UK  share has 
fallen from  one  third at  the  turn of  the  century to  under  one  tenth now. 
Further,  the  technological  sophistication of  the  goods  she  does  export 
has  been seriously falling behind  that of her main  competitors.  Unit 
values of  engineering exports were  broac~y comparable  between Germany, 
France  and  UK  in the early  1960s  but  by  !975  German  and  French unit values 
were  about  60%  and  40%  higqer  respectively.  Consequently the  UK  has 
:1 
suffered a  chronic and  worsening balance of  trade. 
Britain's traditional export markets  in Commonwealth  countries outside 
Europe  remained  important  right  through  the  1960s.  Indeed it was  only in 
1973  that more  than half UK  exports went  to Eastern and  Western European 
countries. 
By  contrast,  during  the  1950s  and  1960s  the  Community  countries were 
experiencing a  period of  rapid  growth  and  integration.  Thus,  I  feel  that 
a  large part of  the  problem  today is that Britain joined  the Community  too 
late,  indeed at  the worst  possible moment,  on  the  eve of an international 
recession. 
UK  has  been  slow to  follow  Germany's  lead  in developing  new  industries 
such as chemicals,  electricity generation and  advanced machinery  and  to 
move  resources  from  declining  to more  advanced  sectors. ·--~--~-------·------.,---------------~--------------
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In the  1980s  the  focus  of  economic  activity •ill probably shift from 
W.  Europe  to  the  newly  industrialising countries of  Sout~rn Europe,  Latin 
America,  and  South-East Asia.  Becaus~ of its  posi~ion at the  lower end  of 
the  product  sophistication spectrum  (i.e.  increasingly  p~oducing products 
where  price rather  than non-price  factors  are  important)  UK  is likely to  be 
one  of  the countries most  severely affected by  competition from  newly 
industrialising countries. 
The  role of  Business and  Government 
I  am  conscious  that  in addressing the Institute of Directors,  I  am 
speaking  to  a  large  extent: to  those  who  have  been  responsibl~ for  the 
planning and  strategic decision-making of British industry,  for  some  time. 
Many  of  you  have  lived with  the  experience of British industry during  the 
whole  period when  the  foundations  of  the present crisis were  laid;  when  the 
basic  trends  emerged  which are now  proving  to  be  $o  prejudicial for  the 
future. 
What  happened?  Where,  did  things  go  wrong? 
First, it seems  to  me,  that with some  notable exceptions  there has  been 
a  lack of  foresight  and  successful  strAtegic planning.  In the private 
sector this has  been  the  responsibility of  the firms  themselves,  particularly 
in Britain where  I,gather that many  of  .,0111  eonsider as  a  point of  principle 
that it is  the  firm,  not  government which  is re$-ponsible for  the  fundamental 
entrepreneurial decisions.  I  do  not altogether disagree;  but one  then has 
to draw  the  corresponding conclusions. 
. I. - II  -
For  example,  I  am  surprised,  not  to  say disappointed,  that as we 
enter a  new  round  of  international  textile negotiations we  face  demands 
from  the  industry for  an  even  longer  period of more  stringent protection; 
whereas  the  terms  of  the existing agreement,  and  a  cursory review of  inter-
national  industrial development  would  have  convinced most  people  - five  years 
ago  - that this would  not be  a  tenable position today. 
r  Thereagain,  I  wish that as  we  enter a  period of  rapid change  arising 
from  the  information techndlogies,  that  the British firms  in this sector 
had  succeeded  in sustaining  the  commanding  positio~ which  they used  to  hold. 
Secondly,  several  successive attempts  to  get  the  relationship between 
government  and  industry right have  clearlyfailed in this country.  I  am  not 
really thinking  in terms  of  the party political debate here which you 
all know  so  well.  I  have  more  practical  cpncerns: 
Continuity:  Industrial policy is about  influencing the course of 
industrial development.  Industrial  structures can be  changed  more  or  less 
rapidly,  they do  not  change  overnight.  Now,  it is self-evident  that policies 
which  have  failed must  ·;,e  changed,  and  the responsibility for  change  must  be 
vested  in those who  are able  and  willing  to carry it out.  But  industrial 
change  involves  thousa~ds of  firms  and  hundreds  of  thousands  of working  people.  t  . 
Changes  in industrial policy should  take account of  the maximum  speed at 
which  change  can be  undertaken. 
Communications:  A distinguished  and  perspicacious Japanese  economist  (I) 
recently attributed the  successful  development of Japanese  industry to: 
group  dynamics  between industrial managers  and  government 
officials producing better strategic decisions;  and 
. I. 
(I)  Professor  Nishyama,  Royal  Institute  for  International Affairs, 
Brussels,  II March  1980. - 12  -
shopfloor worker  participation giving rise  to  technological 
innovation and  enhanced  productivity. 
Even  allowing  for  a  degree of  - not unjustified  - self-congratulation, 
the  thesis bears  thinking about;  not  least because  no-one WDuld  suspect 
Japanese  government  and  society of being un-responsive  to business 
interests.  Indeed  the reverse  is  true. 
What  do  we  have  to  learn from  successful  examples  of  communications 
between government,  managers,  and  employees?  Howdo  we  leacn it? 
I  do  not pretend  to have  the  answer  but  I  do  feel  that  there  should be 
an  "examen  de conscience"  ~n Government  and  Management  as  to why  the 
British experience is so different  from  that of t:he:  rest of  the  industrial 
world. 
\ 
Thirdly,  there has  been  a  particular problem of managing  industrial 
development  in the public .sector,  where  through bad  luck or bad. judgment, 
serious errors have  been made: 
in  the  investment  plans of  the  steel industry; 
in  the  structure of  the  autotnPhile:  industry; 
in national R and  D priorities. 
I 
For  my  part  I  do  not  think  that  these  prob.~ can be  resolved at this 
stage  simply by  returning to the  priv.at.e  econo.~;o...  All  large industrial 
states have  come  to  terms with  the  fact that  the:Dublic authorities are 
irrevocably involved with  the  industrial ecomomy. 
True,  the manifestations of  this. relationship vary  from  country  to 
c:ountry.  And  I  wish  to  draw  your attention  to elle  important  point.  Tbe 
kind  of relationship between  government·  a'ftd.  indus:try which  has  .emerged  in 
the medium  sized  industrial economies  is inappropriat;e  to  t~ aeale of the 
modern  economy. - 13  -
Within  the  Common  Market,  public  intervention originally conceived  to 
counter private national monopolies  loses its raison d'etre in a  larger, 
more  competitive market.  On  the other  hand  the  kinds  of  public  inter-
vention which have  proved most  effective in the  United  States - Government 
purchasing  and  financing of  R and  D - are  inaccessible in Europe  as  long  as 
heterogeneous  industrial policies are dispersed  among  the member  states. 
Community  policies 
In this context  the  Community  has  s~averal. r.oles  to play.  In  the 
first place,  th e  Community  should  have  a  stabilising and moderating role 
on  the  relationships between  government  and  industry;  particularly as  the 
larger market  provides  a  theatre for  positive and  successful  cooperation between 
public authorities and  industry - as  several member  states have  shown. 
Secondly,  we  have  to  provide  the  countervailing arguments  against  the 
protectionist pressures which naturally arise in  those  sectors which  are 
under greatest pressure.  The·  Community  still has 'more  to  lose  than  to  gain 
from  generalised protection,  and  we  have  to  find  alternative solutions  to 
industrial adjustment.  I  know  that at certain times  in  the past,  other 
countries have  successfully built up  internationally competitive industries, 
behind protective barriers, but would  such an approach be effective in  the 
UK  today,  when  the  principal  problem  seems  to be  the  inadequate response of 
British firms  to  evident market  trends. 
Would  general  protection change  attitudes  in this crucial  respect? 
Thirdly,  the  Community  has  an essential  role in achieving agreement 
when  trade policies are necessary.  There  are  several  examples  where  the 
Community  does  have  to manage  its international  trade.  Needless  to  say  the 
outcome  is not  to everyone's  satisfaction but  I  have  no  doubt  that both 
within  the  Community  and  internationally  the  exceptions  to  free  trade will 
be more  acceptable and  less damaging  if they are based  on an  agreed 
Community  position.  The  Community  has  shown  it can reach reasonable  agreed 
solutions  in this area.  Unilateral action is not acceptable. 14  -
Finally,  the  Community  mus.t  develop  indu.strial  policies which  are 
appropriate  to  the  new  situation sinee <.the  energy::.ctrisis ,and  the  receu.i•.a  .. 
The  Common  Market  policies which  succeeded  during  the  period of  high 
growth  in integrating the market  in most  of  the original ,member  states are 
c.lcarly insufficient  in  the  present context.  I  need  not  t.Oll  you  that  the 
Community  has  to date  singularly failed  to  reach decisions,in this area. 
I  think  the  fundamental  reason  for  this is that  the  successful 
countries cannot  accept policies which  would  inhibit  the  p•rformance of 
their best  firms,  nor accept policies which  in effect  give~ blessing to 
national policies which have  been  shown  to be  ineffective. 
i 
On  the other hand,  Community  policies must  be  able  to extend  the 
methods  and  resources of successful policies  to the Community  as a  whole, 
whether  the  example  comes  from  one  of  the member ;s;tates or from  an  inter-
national competitor. 
For  example,  the  information industries  - communications,  computers, 
micro  processors  - have  developed  in Japan and  the  United  States well  beyond 
our own  capacities. 
European  industry cannot  afford to let such opportunities pass  by.  It 
is of  the  essence of  European  indust~y~s lagg-tecm competitive position 
that  the opportuni,t:ies which  do  arise LIH"  ,new  .. pro®cts  involving new 
markets  and  new  technologies  have  to·be taken. 
This is why,  in its most  recent .cproposals  '~he ~commission envisages  a 
European  Strategy for  information t.echnologies.  You  will  find  these  set out 
in the  report which was  presented  to  the  European~Council in Dublin last 
December  on  "European Society confro.nti!d  with the .challenge of  information 
technologies"(!). 
(1)  COM  (79)  650  final. -------. ~---------------
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Modern  Europe  society is already an  "information society" and  a  new 
family  of  electronic  technologies  is  transforming  the  way  information 
networks work,  reducing  the  cost of  information enormously and 
transforming office work  and  industrial production in the process. 
This  is brought  about by  digital coding  in telecommunication,  by 
new  transmission techniques  such as  satellites and  optical fibres  and  by  the 
processor or  "chip". 
Europe  will have  to  apply these  technologies  on  a  vast scale.  Many 
people will  have  to  change  their  jobs as  a  result.  There will be  an 
enormous  need  for  retraining. 
The  market  for  these  technologies  is enormous;  it is growing most 
rapidly in Europe: 
The  world  market  for  telec~nununication.is 26  biUion EUA  per year: 
'  Europe  represents  one  third.  For  computers  it is ,45  billion EUA: 
i 
Europe  accounts  for  30%.  For micro  components it is 41  billion EUA: 
Europe,  25%. 
But  European  industry,  whether  European owned,  or manufacturing in 
Europe  are  far  behind  this rapidly growing market  :  16%  of  the 
computer  market:  a  quarter of  the  peri-informatics market.  We  import 
80%  of  our  requir~ments for  integrated circuits! 
To  respond  to  this situation and  turn back  the unfavourable  trend 
the  Commission  has  described  in detail a  Community  strategy: 
to  influence attitudes  throughout  society to  favour  innovation 
and  change; - 16  -
to  use  the  Community's  p<Wers  to  integrate the:market  for  these 
products; 
to promote  the  European  information industry; 
to  encourage cooperation between  industry and  users; 
to apply  these  technologies  1n  the  Community  itself; 
to  enhance  programmes  for  satellite communications. 
Here  at least is a  comprehensive,  high priority programme  for  filling 
one  of  the major  technological  lacunae in European industry. 
These  proposals are  a  test for all concerned: 
for  the Governments,  who  have  to  take political decisions,  both 
in the  Council  and  with their own  departments  - especially 
telecommunications; 
for  industry,  which  h~s  to rise to  a  monumental  international 
technological  challenge; 
for working  people  and  trade unions  to respond flexibly and  construe-
tively to  the  inevitable; 
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for  the  Commission,  which will have  to  implement  a  major work 
programme  - which  does  not  go  without  saying. either. 
1  hope  this will  be  a  turning point  both for  industrial policy in 
the Community  and  for  the  industrial economy  in Europe.  Because  if we 
do  not  succeed  in breaking  the  trend and  turning  the  tide,  the  industrial 
prospect  for most  of  Europe  is, as  I  think I  have  shown  you, 
bleak indeed. 